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LIABILITY AMONG ATTORNEYS IN
LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In several recent malpractice cases, attorneys have attempted to lessen or avoid liability by claiming they should be
entitled to contribution or indemnity from another attorney involved in the matter. Liability has been imposed when the attorney being sued was either a successor attorney or co-counsel. A
referral attorney may also be subject to a legal malpractice action, although no cases have yet been decided involving this type
of relationship.
This Note discusses the successor attorney, co-counsel, and
referral attorney relationships and the desirability of allowing
contribution or indemnity claims based on these relationships.
The author concludes that liability should be imposed in referral
and co-counsel situations, but not when the attorney is only a
successor.
II.

FRAMEWORK OF RELATIONSHIPS: SUCCESSOR ATTORNEY, CoCOUNSEL, AND THE REFERRAL ATTORNEY

The three relationships upon which a legal malpractice action may be based are quite common. First, an attorney might
seek contribution or indemnity from a successor attorney. For
example, a client retains Attorney I in a personal injury matter.
Attorney I negligently handles the case at trial. The client dismisses Attorney I and retains Attorney HI, who handles the appeal. When the appeal is unsuccessful, Attorney II represents
the client in a malpractice action against Attorney I. Attorney I
cross-claims against Attorney II on theories of contribution or
indemnity, claiming the actions of Attorney II in handling the
appeal harmed the client.
An attorney might also seek contribution or indemnity
* The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor Nathan Crystal for his
guidance in selection of this topic and editorial advice on numerous drafts of the Note.
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against an associate attorney. For example, a client hires Attorney I to handle a divorce. Because the divorce involves complicated tax questions, Attorney I associates Attorney II, a tax specialist, to handle the tax aspects of the divorce. The tax
specialist mishandles the case and the client sues Attorney I and
Attorney II. Subsequently, Attorney I cross-claims against Attorney II seeking contribution or indemnity.
Finally, an attorney might seek contribution or indemnity
from an attorney to whom a case was referred. For example, a
client wishes to patent an invention. The client consults his
usual attorney, Attorney I, who refers the matter to a patent expert, Attorney II. The patent expert fails to protect the client's
interests and the client subsequently brings a malpractice action
against Attorneys I and II. Again, Attorney I seeks contribution
or indemnity from Attorney II.

III.

THEORIES OF RECOVERY: CONTRIBUTION AND
INDEMNIFICATION

An attorney could rely on either the theory of contribution
or of indemnity to shift liability to a successor attorney. Under
the theory of contribution,' the former attorney would argue
that even if he was negligent, the successor attorney's negligence
contributed to the loss and, therefore, liability should be apportioned between the two.
Historically, there was no right of contribution among joint
tortfeasors.2 Gradually, the rule was modified to allow contribu-

1. Contribution is an equitable doctrine requiring the sharing of a loss among joint
tortfeasors. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 50 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A and Comment c
(1977) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]; 18 AM. JUR. 2d Contribution §§ 1-3, (1965
and Supp. 1981). Usually, the loss is apportioned pro rata, but in some jurisdictions lia-

bility is allocated on a comparative fault basis.

PROSSER,

§ 50 at 310; RESTATEMENT §

886A, Comment h. See also R. MALLEN & V. LEvrrT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, (2d ed. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as MALLEN]; H. WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE-COMPARATIVE FAULT,

§§ 13:5-13:10 and Appendix (1978) [hereinafter cited as WOODS]; UNIF. CONTRmUTION
AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, § 1, 12 U.L.A. 57 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CONTRUTION

ACT].
South Caroline' comparative negligence statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-300 (1976),
applying only to motor vehicle accidents, was declared unconstitutional as violative of
the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Marley v. Kirby, 271
S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978).
2. This bar against recovery originated in the English case of Merryweather v.
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tion among negligent tortfeasors3 and in favor of a tortfeasor
only legally or technically liable.4 For example, a businessperson
hires a salesperson to represent the company to various customers throughout a state. While driving a company car to visit a
customer, the salesperson causes a collision injuring a third
party. Although not personally negligent, the employer is legally
liable for all tortious injuries caused by the salesperson while the
salesperson is acting within the scope of her employment. To
mitigate the economic harshness of this rule, employers were allowed to seek contribution from negligent employees.
In many jurisdictions, the common law doctrine precluding
contribution among tortfeasors has been abrogated by statute or
judicial decision. 5 By 1979, over thirty jurisdictions allowed contribution.' Although most common law and statutory rules still
preclude contribution among intentional tortfeasors, some

Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799). In Merryweather, the court stated that the policy
behind a bar to recovery by a joint tortfeasor on the theory of contribution was that
courts should not allow an intentional tortfeasor to profit from a wrong. Id.
3. PROSSER § 50 at 306; RESTATEMENT § 886A, Comment a.
4. PROSSER § 50 at 306-08; RESTATEMENT § 886A, Comment a.
5. PROSSER § 50 at 307; RESTATEMENT § 886A, Comment a; 18 AM. JUR. 2d Contribution § 41 at 61 (1965); see generally, WOODS §§ 13:5-13:10 and Appendix (full discussion
of comparative fault, contribution, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,
and a state by state outline of contribution statutes).
South Carolina follows the common law rule barring contribution among joint
tortfeasors. Atlantic C.L.R. Co. v. Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 132 S.E.2d 172 (1963).
6. Some jurisdictions abrogated the no-contribution rule by judicial decision. E.g.,
Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d
23 (1956). Other jurisdictions adopted statutes allowing contribution. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. §§ 09.16.010 - .060 (1962); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE 11 §§ 875-880 (West 1954); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.31 (West Supp. 1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 412.030 (1970); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 17.225 - .305 (1973); see Note, Contribution and Indemnity - An Examination of
the Upheaval in Minnesota Tort Loss Allocation Concepts, 5 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV.
109, 121 (1979).
Many of the state contribution statutes were adoptions of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act. CONTRIBUTION AcT, § 1, 12 U.L.A. 57. Originally adopted in
1939, the Act was revised in 1975. The Act allows contribution on a pro rata basis among
persons who are jointly and severally liable for an injury. Id. §§ 1, 2, Commissioner's
Prefatory Note (1939 Act); see also §§ 3-9. The main difference between the 1939 Act
and the 1975 revised Act is in the allocation of loss. The 1939 Act contained an optional
provision allowing proportionate allocation of loss. However, the 1955 revision states that
"[iun determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability (a) their relative degrees of fault shall not be considered. . . ." Id. § 2 at 87. For a discussion and list
of jurisdictions following the 1939 Act and the 1955 revised Act, see id. Commissioner's
Prefatory Note (1955 Revision and Supp. 1982). See also WooDs, supra note 1.
7. See CONTRIBUTION AcT, supra note 6, at § 1(c).
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courts have interpreted statutes to allow contribution even
among these tortfeasors.5
While contribution apportions the loss between two or more
tortfeasors, indemnity shifts the entire loss from one only secondarily and legally liable, to one primarily and actually liable.9
Again, the example of an employer's liability for the tortious
acts of an employee illustrates this point.
Courts have developed two modifications of the pure theory
of indemnity: equitable indemnity and partial indemnity. These
modifications developed because of the unavailability of contribution in a particular jurisdiction coupled with the unfairness of
a total shift of liability under the pure theory of indemnity.10
Equitable indemnity refers to situations in which indemnification is allowed even though no contractual or legal relationship
exists between the party seeking indemnification and the party
from whom indemnification is sought. For example, courts have
allowed indemnification if the negligence of a subsequent
tortfeasor aggravates the harm caused by a prior wrongdoer."
8. PROSSER § 50 at 308.

9. PROSSER § 51 at 310-11; RESTATEMENT § 886A subsection 4, Comment 1 and subsection 3, Comment j; WOODS § 13:11 at 236-37, 41 Am. JuR. 2d Indemnity § 1 at n.5
(1965). For a general discussion of the doctrines of contribution and indemnity, see
Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1170
(1941); Leflar, Contributionsand Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130
(1932) [hereinafter cited as Leflar].
10. Indemnity traditionally has been an absolute remedy-either the tortfeasor was
allowed indemnity or the wrongdoer received nothing. Courts readily expanded the theory, usually allowing indemnity rather than rejecting it. RESTATEMENT § 886A subsection
(4), Comment [1] and § 886B, Comment 1. Furthermore, courts in some jurisdictions
became increasingly frustrated with inequitable statutory restrictions on the right to
contribution and the all or nothing harshness of indemnity. RESTATEMENT § 886B, Comment m. See Ford Motor Co. v. Robert J. Poeschl, Inc., 21 Cal. App. 3d 694, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 702 (1971)(allowing action for indemnity by automobile dealer agains manufacturer notwithstanding dealer's own breach of duty). Since the courts were unable to
change the statutes, they judically created the equitable doctrine of partial indemnity
and declared the doctrine to be subject to further expansion if necessary to achieve justice. RESTATEMENT § 886B, Comment m.
11. Although the right to indemnification commonly arises out of contract, the right
can also be enforced by operation of law. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 51, at 310; RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 886B Comment j. There is no right to indemnity if the parties are
in pari delicto. PROSSER, § 51; WOODS, supra note 1, § 13:11, at 237; RESTATEMENT §
886B, Comment a. Noncontractual types of indemnity, often called "contracts implied
by law," were not based on consensual obligations to indemnity, but rather were based
on principles of equity and fairness. Leflar, supra note 9, at 146. A person's liability for a
tort comes under this principle of equitable indemnity. Id. The policy behind indemnity
comes from restitution and the prevention of unjust enrichment. RESTATEMENT § 886B
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Under the doctrine of partial indemnity, courts allocate the
loss in proportion to the fault of the parties.12 Partial indemnity
may be available to a tortfeasor even when common law or statutory contribution is not available. For example, partial indemnity may be available to an intentional tortfeasor even in jurisdictions barring contribution among intentional tortfeasors.
Additionally, partial indemnity may be available even after the
statute of limitations has run on an action for contribution."

As

a result of the expansion of the theories, they are often
14
confused.

IV. LIABILITY OF A SUCCESSOR ATTORNEY TO THE FORMER
ATTORNEY

A.

Original View: Successor Attorney Not Liable on Theory
of Contributionor Indemnity

Because the growth of malpractice litigation against lawyers
is of relatively recent origin, it is not surprising that the cases
allowing contribution and indemnity among lawyers also are relatively recent. Almost all of the cases are from California, one of
the frontiers of malpractice litigation. Early cases denied recovery by a former attorney against a successor, but some recent
decisions allowed these claims.
In Held v. Arant,1 5 Attorney I represented a client in negotiations and the drafting of an agreement with a third party. As
a result of the negligence of Attorney I, the third party sued the
client for misrepresentation. The client, represented by Attorney
II, sued Attorney I for malpractice. Attorney I cross-complained
Comment c. See generally, RESTATEMENT OF

RESTITUTION §

76 (1937).

12. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d
899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288,
331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
13. For example, both the CONTRIBUTION ACr and the California contribution statute preclude contribution between intentional tortfeasors. CoNTRIBuTION AcT, supranote
1, at § 1(c); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 875(d) (West 1980). Additionally, the CONTRmUTION
AcT contains only a one year statute of limitations on an action to enforce a right of
contribution. CONTRIBUTION AcT § 3(c). However, both the CoNTrUTION ACT and the
California statute state that nothing in the Act precludes any right to indemnity. CONTRBUTION AcT § 1(f); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 875(f) (West 1980).
14. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 51, at 310 n.89; WOODS, supra note 1, § 13:10, at 236.
15. 67 Cal. App. 3d 748, 134 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1977).
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seeking indemnification from Attorney II.16 The cross-complaint
alleged that Attorney II had settled matters in the earlier suit by
the third party in a way that damaged Attorney I and exposed
him to liability for malpractice. Attorney I appealed the trial
court's decision to sustain a general demurrer to the crosscomplaint.
On appeal, Attorney I argued that privity was no longer required in an action for malpractice and therefore an attorney
was "liable for his negligence to anyone who foreseeably may be
damaged by it."' 17 However, the California Court of Appeal held
that even though privity was no longer a prerequisite, an attorney's liability was limited to the intended beneficiaries of his ac-

tion.18 The court found that Attorney I was not an intended
beneficiary of the actions of Attorney II.1e
After deciding the cross-complaint could not be sustained
on the grounds of duty or privity, the court addressed the issue
of a subsequent tortfeasor's liability for aggravation of an in-

jury. 20 The court noted, without explanation, that in the case of

a physician aggravating an injury caused by a negligent prior
tortfeasor, the possibility that the second physician might be

sued by the original tortfeasor would not inhibit the second physician in the performance of his duties.2 1 Conversely, when At-

torney II is retained to represent a client against Attorney I, allowing Attorney I to cross-complain against Attorney II "could

impinge upon the undivided loyalty owed by counsel."22 The

16. Attorney II, who had also represented the client in the negotiations with the
third party, was the client's sole counsel in the malpractice action. No claim of co-counsel liability was argued. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
17. 67 Cal. App. 3d at 751, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423 (citing Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d
223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d
685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961)).
18. 67 Cal. App. 3d at 751, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423 (citing National Auto. and Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Atkins, 45 Cal. App. 3d 562, 565, 119 Cal. Rptr. 618, 619 (1975)) (holding attorneys
had no duty toward insurance company, for which attorney procured attachment bonds,
to prosecute action against defendant); Norton y. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 921, 123
Cal. Rptr. 237, 239 (1975); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App.
3d 104, 110, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901, 906 (1975) (holding attorney liable to potential creditor
of client for failure to give material information about client's business partnership).
19. 67 Cal. App. 3d at 751, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
20. Id.
21. This reasoning has been questioned. See Parker v. Morton, 117 Cal. App. 3d
751, 755 n.1, 173 Cal. Rptr. 197, 199 n.1 (1981).
22. 67 Cal. App. 3d at 752, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
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Court of Appeals concluded that the nature of the attorney-client relationship required that an attorney not be subjected to a
possible action for indemnification from a potential adversary.
The court reasoned that an attorney's ability to counsel a client
about alternative courses of action should not be inhibited by
the fact that the client's choice of one course of action over another could subject the attorney to a claim for indemnification
from a former attorney of the client.23
Following the Held decision, the California Supreme Court
in American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court2" broadened
the doctrine of indemnity in California25 to allow for partial indemnity. California had recognized an action for proportionate
indemnity only when the actions of a subsequent tortfeasor aggravated the injuries ar,ady suffered by the injured parties.28 In
American Motorcycle, the court stated that "a concurrent
tortfeasor may obtain partial indemnity from co-tortfeasors on a
27
compai.tive fault basis.

23. Id.
24. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978). For a full discussion of
American Motorcycle, see McCay, American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court:
From ComparativeNegligence to Comparative Indemnity, 5 ORANGE CouNTY BAR J. 180
(1978).
25. California's equitable indemnity rule was first announced in Peters v. City &
County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 419, 260 P.2d 55 (1953) and first applied in City &
County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 330 P.2d 802 (1958).
26. See, Niles v. City of San Rafael, 42 Cal. App. 3d 230, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1974);
Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1964).
27. 20 Cal. 3d at 608, 578 P.2d at 918, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 201. In American Motorcycle, a minor was injured in a motorcycle race sponsored by two motorcycle associations.
The minor, through a guardian ad litem, sued the motorcycle association alleging that
the racetrack was negligently designed and managed and that the defendants had negligently solicited entrants for the race. The defendants asserted that the minor's injuries
were caused by his own negligence. The association also alleged that the minor's parents
failed to exercise their power of supervision over the minor and sought "declaration of
the 'allocable negligence' of [the minor's] parents. . . ." Id. at 585, 578 P.2d at 903, 146
Cal. Rptr. at 186. The association based its claim for declaratory relief on the assumption
that California's comparative negligence law had abrogated the requirement of joint and
several liability and replaced it with proportionate liability. Under the proportionate liability theory, each tortfeasor could be held liable for only a portion of the injury determined on a comparative fault basis. Id. at 585-86, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
The trial court rejected that defend .t's claim and denied the association's motion to
cross-complain against the parents. Id. at 585, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
The court began its analysis by rejecting the notion that California's comparative
negligence law abolished the requirement of joint and several liability. The court stated
that joint and several liability meant different things in different situations. In the case
of concurrent negligence, joint and several liability meant that:
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Although the American Motorcycle decision did not involve
legal malpractice, the general shift in the California law should
have signaled easier availability of indemnity in all tort cases,
including legal malpractice. However, subsequent California decisions continued to hold that a defendant attorney could not
recover from a client's subsequent attorney on either a contribution or indemnity theory.28 In Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher v. Superior Court,29 an attorney was sued for malpractice for failing
to perfect an enforceable security interest. The attorney represented a client who guaranteed a bank loan to a third party
company. In return, the company conveyed security interests in
personal property to the bank. The company defaulted and the
client paid off the loan. The bank assigned the security interests
to the client; but when the client tried to enforce the interests,
the company filed for bankruptcy. In the bankruptcy proceedings, other creditors challenged the validity of the client's interest in the property. A second law firm representing the client in
the bankruptcy proceedings entered into a settlement with the
other creditors and filed suit against the bank and the former
attorney for failing to create enforceable interests and for failing

a tortfeasor is liable for any injury of which his negligence is a proximate
cause. Liability attaches ...not because he is responsible for the acts of other
independent tortfeasors who may also have caused the injury, but because he
is responsible for all damages of which his negligence was a proximate cause.
Id. at 586, 578 P.2d at 904, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 187. The court stated that because fault
could be apportioned on a comparative fault basis did not "render an indivisible injury
'divisible' for the purpose of 'joint and several liability.'" Id. at 588, 578 P.2d at 905, 146
Cal. Rptr. at 188. A concurrent tortfeasor was still liable for the total injury reduced only
"'in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering."' Id.
at 590, 578 P.2d at 906-07, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189-90.
After examining the California courts' struggle with the harsh all-or-nothing rule of
equitable indemnity, the California Supreme Court held that the California equitable
indemnity rule should be modified to allow a concurrent tortfeasor to obtain partial indemnity. The court reasoned that nothing in the California contribution statute precluded such a ruling, and nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure precluded a crosscomplaint for partial indemnity. Id. at 599-607, 578 P.2d at 912-18, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195201. Cf. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972)
(expanding New York law to allow a tortfeasor to seek partial indemnification). For a
full discussion of Dole, see Torts - New York Civil Practice: A Joint Tortfeasor Accorded Unlimited Right to Implead a Co-TortfeasorFor PartialIndemnification Based
on Comparative Responsibility in Negligence - Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 47 N.Y.U.L.
REv.815 (1972).
28. MALLEN, supra note 1, at 164.
29. 94 Cal. App. 3d 347, 156 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1979).
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to tell the client that the interests may not be enforceable.3 0
The bank and the first law firm filed separate cross-complaints for equitable partial indemnity alleging the second law
firm was negligent in its representation of the client during the
bankruptcy proceedings. The second firm demurred. The superior court overruled the demurrer and the second firm
appealed. 1
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal acknowledged the
expansion in the law of equitable indemnity, but made two important factual distinctions between the Gibson and American
Motorcycle cases.3 2 Relying almost exclusively on the Held reasoning, the court concluded that imposing liability on a successor attorney would create a conflict of interest. In the words of
the court:
What is pertinent here is the effect upon the relationship between lawyer II and the client when the client's alternatives
are under consideration. Lawyer II should not be required to
face a potential conflict between the course which is in client's
best interest and the course which would minimize his exposure to the cross-complaint of lawyer I"
An almost identical conclusion was reached in Commercial
Standard Title Co. v. Superior Court.34 In Commercial Standard, an attorney represented a client in a real estate transaction with a third party. 5 An agent of the third party told the
attorney that the title to the land to be conveyed to the client

30. Id. at 349-50, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 327-28.
31. Id. at 350, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
32. In American Motorcycle, the court believed that the effect of a cross-complaint
on the relationships in the case before it would be less serious than the effect on the
attorney-client relationship. In addition, the court noted that American Motorcycle dealt
with a single indivisible harm. Id. at 351-52, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 328-29.
33. Gibson, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 356, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 331. In his dissent, Justice
Jefferson distinguished Goodman, Held and Morton, concluding that Gibson fell within
the American Motorcycle rationale. Justice Jefferson stated that the policy reasons behind American Motorcycle are more important than a public policy protecting attorneys
from liability to a person who deals with an attorney's client. Furthermore, he saw no
conflict of interest and would have allowed an action for equitable indemnity. Id. at 35761, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 332-34, (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
34. 92 Cal. App. 3d 934, 155 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1979).
35. In the transaction, the client and a third party agreed to exchange parcels of
land. Escrows were prepared and submitted to a title insurance company. Id. at 937, 155
Cal. Rptr. at 396.
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was unencumbered and that a title company had issued a report
indicating the status of the land. The representative of the third
party gave the attorney a lot book guarantee issued by two title
companies. After the exchange, the client discovered the property he received in exchange was subject to a trust deed for
which he had not bargained. The client sued the title companies
for issuing a defective lot book guaranty, and the title companies
cross-complained against the attorney for advising the client to
rely on the guaranty. The title companies based their cross-complaint on the partial indemnity rule announced in American
Motorcycle.3
The appellate court did not find the expansion of the law
under American Motorcycle persuasive on the facts of Commercial Standard. Although recognizing the expansion, the Commercial Standard court also noted that the expansion was not
intended as a panacea for all tort claimants. The court noted the
new doctrine applied only in appropriate cases, quoting a list of
exceptions included in a footnote in American Motorcycle.3 7 The
court found two reasons why the attorney in Commercial Standard was not a concurrent tortfeasor for the purposes of the expanded indemnity doctrine. First, the attorney could not be held
liable for a whole indivisible injury. Second, the attorney's wrong
arose independently and not from a violation of a common
duty.3 8 The court also relied on the Held rationale to deny the
cross-complaint, stating that the threat of a lawsuit could inhibit
attorney-client communications and could allow an attorney being sued by his original client for malpractice to require the second attorney to disqualify himself. 9
The Supreme Court of Utah, in Hughes v. Housley, °
reached a similar conclusion. In Hughes, two persons and a corporation entered into an escrow agreement under which one of
the three persons was to act as escrow agent and hold stock certificates. Later, a disagreement arose between the corporation,
the plaintiff Hughes, and a third party, Glenn, over the ownership of the stock. The escrow agent instituted an interpleader

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 938, 155 Cal. Rptr. at
Id. at 940, 155 Cal. Rptr. at
Id. at 943, 155 Cal. Rptr. at
Id. at 945-46, 155 Cal. Rptr.
599 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1979).

396.
397.
399.
at 400-01.
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action seeking a court declaration as to the ownership of the
stock. Hughes retained Attorney I to represent him in the interpleader action. The Corporation and Glenn filed an answer
claiming that Hughes had no right or interest in the certificates.
However, the answer was never served on Hughes or Attorney I,
and Attorney I did not file a responsive pleading. A default judgment was entered against Hughes.41
Hughes terminated his relationship with Attorney I and retained Attorney II. Attorney II filed a motion to set aside the
default judgment, but the motion was denied. Subsequently, Attorney II filed a complaint against Attorney I alleging that Attorney I was negligent in allowing the entry of a default judgment and failing to have the judgment set aside. Attorney I filed
a third-party complaint alleging that Attorney II was negligent
in failing to have the default judgment set aside. Alternatively,
Attorney I claimed Attorney II aggravated the client's damages
and therefore Attorney I was entitled to indemnification. 4 2 Attorney II then moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on
the basis that the complaint did not state a cause of action upon

which relief could be granted. The trial court dismissed the complaint and Attorney I appealed.'3
In deciding the trial court did not err in dismissing Attorney
I's complaint, the Utah Supreme Court rejected Attorney I's
claim that the alleged negligence of Attorney II aggravated the
client's injuries. Although the court acknowledged the appeal of
the analogy to the case of a successor physician aggravating an
injury, the court noted a flaw in the analogy: "assuming arguendo that [Attorney HI] was negligent in his handling of the case,
his negligence cannot be said to have aggravated Hughes' injury
or added to the damage."' 44 The court stated that by the time

the client retained Attorney II, the damage was complete. 5
The Utah Supreme Court also agreed with the trial court
that the third-party complaint failed to state a cause of action
against Attorney II for negligence. The court stated that no duty
existed between Attorney II and Attorney I. Additionally, the

41. Id. at 1252.

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1253.
Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

11

SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
[Vol.
South Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2020], Art.
6

34

court rejected the negligence claim on policy grounds. Using
analysis similar to that applied in Held, the court reasoned that
"[t]o impose such a duty [on a successor attorney in favor of a
former attorney] would be to subject the second attorney to po'46
tential conflicts of interest in trying to serve two masters.
B. Recent View: Liability of Successor Attorney on Theory
of Contribution and Indemnity
As in the cases outlining the historical restrictions on actions for contribution or indemnity, California furnishes the recent leading decisions allowing actions for contribution and indemnity in legal malpractice actions. According to these cases,
actions for contribution and indemnity might be allowed if the
case does not involve a choice between alternative courses of action requiring professional judgment.
Parker v. Morton 47 is the leading case permitting an action
for contribution or indemnity in a legal malpractice case. In
Parker,Attorney I represented the wife in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. During the proceeding, Attorney I failed to litigate the wife's community property interests in her husband's
vested military pension.4 8 Subsequently, the wife retained Attorney II to correct the problem of the unlitigated pension rights.
Attorney II apparently also failed to pursue properly the wife's
claim to her former husband's pension. The wife sued Attorney I
for legal malpractice. Attorney I cross-complained against Attorney II for total or partial indemnity. 49 Attorney II based his defense on the principle that an attorney sued for malpractice
"may not successfully cross-complain against the client's successor attorney retained to remedy the problem created by the alleged negligence of the first attorney."5 0
The court of appeal noted that although there was authority
for the rule relied on by Attorney 11,51 the policies upon which

46. Id. at 1254.
47. 117 Cal. App. 3d 751, 173 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1981).
48. Under the prevailing California law, military pensions were considered community property. Id. at 754, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 198. Military pensions are no longer considered divisible community property. McCarty v. McCarty, 449 U.S. 1122 (1981).
49. Parker, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 751, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
50. Id. at 754, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 198-99.
51. Id. (citations omitted).
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the court had based its decisions in the Held line of cases were
inapplicable to Parker.52 The court stated that to deny the
cross-complaint "would be inconsistent with long established legal principles, themselves, founded on important public policy
' The long-established legal principle referred
considerations."53
to by the court was the rule that a subsequent tortfeasor who
aggravates damages previously suffered by the injured party
may be held liable for all damages.5" The court reasoned that
this principle was also based on important policy considerations
and should not be departed from without compelling reasons. 5
The court of appeal concluded that denial of contribution or indemnity might be proper in cases involving an attorney's choice
between alternative courses of action56 requiring the exercise of
professional judgment. The court, however, found unpersuasive
the argument that allowing actions for contribution or indemnity could result in subsequent attorneys disqualifying themselves because of the potential conflict of interest. The court recognized the strong policy in favor of free choice of legal
representation, but stated that this policy was not "a complete
shield to the attorney's being responsible for the consequences
of his negligent conduct."5 '
In Sigel v. Superior Court,58 a California Court of Appeal
again denied an attorney's motion for summary judgment on a
second attorney's cross-complaint for indemnity. In Sigel, the
client was injured in a car accident and hired Attorney I to represent her in a personal injury action. Attorney I failed to determine that the other driver was uninsured, failed to file within
a reasonable time after being retained, and failed to serve process on the other driver. The client later substituted Attorney II
as the attorney of record. Attorney II also failed to prosecute the
uninsured motorist claim. The client, represented by Attorney
II, sued Attorney I for malpractice and Attorney I claimed

52. Id. at 756-67, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 200-06.
53. Id. at 755, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 199.

54. Id. at 756, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 199 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 756, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 200.

56. Id. at 767, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 206-07.
57. Id. at 766, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 206.

58. 118 Cal. App. 3d 226, 173 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1981). The opinion for Sigel v. Superior Court was deleted from the official reporter by order of the California Supreme
Court, dated June 17, 1981. See 118 Cal. App. 3d at 226.
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against Attorney II for equitable indemnity. Attorney II filed a
general demurrer which was overruled. After the client substituted a third attorney for Attorney II in the malpractice case,
Attorney II answered the cross-complaint. 9
In support of his motion for judgment on the cross-complaint, Attorney II relied on Gibson.6 0 The court, however, distinguished Gibson and Held based on differences in the nature
of the services rendered in those cases and Sigel. 1 In Gibson
and Held, the Sigel court noted that Attorney H came into the
cases to extricate the client from the situation caused by the
negligence of Attorney I, and that in attempting to resolve the
problem, Attorney II could not be expected to worry about how
the choice of action would look in a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity. 2 However, in Sigel the negligence of Attorney II
was the failure to serve process. 6 3 When Attorney II took over
the case, he inherited an independent duty to prosecute the
case. There was no choice of remedies and no conflict. Attorney
II had to take action on the case in order to escape personal
responsibility for malpractice.6
C.

Critique

In summary, the following general rule seems to be supported by the cases: a prior attorney generally cannot obtain
contribution or indemnity from a subsequent attorney unless the
subsequent attorney violated a clear duty to a client that did not
involve a choice between alternative courses of action. The case
law thus adopts what could be called an intermediate approach.
Claims for contribution or indemnity are allowed, but only
under limited circumstances.
One reason for denying an attorney the right to recover
under a theory of contribution or indemnity against a successor
attorney is essentially doctrinal. For example, in the Commercial
Standard case the court refused to allow indemnity because in
the court's opinion the subsequent attorney was not a co-

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
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tortfeasor.6 5 A doctrinal basis for denying such claims, however,
appears unsound. Formal barriers to the use of contribution and
indemnity have fallen if relief is justified as a matter of public
policy.16 Focusing on the policy reasons for denying these claims
seems more appropriate.
A second argument against allowing a contribution or indemnity claim against a successor attorney is the basic rationale
of the Held decision: allowing such a claim could create a conflict of interest by interfering with a lawyer's independent judgment. 7 The interference with the successor attorney's independent judgment could occur in either of two ways. If a
malpractice claim is being contemplated against the former attorney, a successor attorney may have a tendency to handle the
case in a way that would minimize the likelihood of being exposed to a claim for contribution and indemnity. Second, because of the possibility of becoming involved in the litigation, a
successor attorney might be more reluctant to recommend that a
client file a malpractice claim against a former attorney of the
client.
These claims of interference with the successor attorney's
independent judgment are difficult to evaluate. The court in
Parker pointed out that if the attorney is not faced with a realistic choice between alternative courses of action, the conflict of
interest argument does not seem persuasive."' However, this
conclusion focuses on only the first possible interference with an
attorney's independent judgment. The analysis ignores the second possible situation, that the lawyer might be prone not to
advise the client to bring a malpractice action. Once courts recognize any exception to the general rule barring contribution
and indemnity in malpractice actions, the possibility of a claim
for contribution or indemnity becomes a factor that the successor attorney takes into account in his decisionmaking6 9

65. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 3-13 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
69. The liability of lawyers for malicious prosecution is comparable to legal malpractice liability. In Manson v. Linnick, 255 Cal. App. 2d 589, 63 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1967), an
attorney who knowingly used false testimony in prosecuting his client's claim and delivery action was held to have maliciously prosecuted the action. Thus, in malicious prosecution actions there is an exception to the rule allowing attorneys general immunity from
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A third reason for denying the right of a former attorney
from seeking contribution or indemnity from a successor attorney focuses on the impact that allowing these claims will have
on the efficiency of the judicial system. Suppose an attorney represents a client in a malpractice action against the client's former attorney and the court allows a cross-claim for contribution
or indemnity. On the one hand, the successor attorney's duty to
his client would require him to act zealously to establish the
malpractice of the former attorney. Yet in doing so, the successor attorney would be establishing an essential element of the
claim of the former attorney against himself. Thus, the successor
attorney would have conflicting interests in the litigation. As a
result, the lawyer would be disqualified from representing the
client.70 Therefore, as a consequence of allowing claims for contribution or indemnity, the former attorney would have a
weapon available to disqualify the successor attorney. This
would interfere with the client's right to choose counsel and certainly would disrupt the legal system.
Ways exist, of course, to deal with this problem. First, disqualification of Attorney II is not required merely because Attorney I files a cross-complaint for contribution or indemnity.
The court could hold a preliminary hearing on the probable
merits of the claim for contribution or indemnity. If the court
found the complaint potentially valid, the court could allow the

liability, but the exception is narrower than that recognized in contribution and indemnity actions. In the malicious prosecution situation, the attorney is liable only if he acts
intentionally or in bad faith. See also Annot. 27 A.L.R.3d 11, 13 (1969 and Supp. 1982).
70. According to the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY, DR 5-105(A), 5105(B) (1979), an attorney must decline employment or discontinue representation pursuant to DR 2-110 if the exercise of his independent professional judgment will be or is
likely to be impaired. If an attorney has conflicting financial interests in a case, certainly
his professional judgment is likely to be impaired.
The case of Jedwabny v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 390 Pa. 231, 135 A.2d 252 (1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 966 (1958) illustrates the problem of an attorney representing conflicting interests. The Jedwabny case arose out of a collision between an automobile and
a streetcar. An attorney represented the automobile driver and his passengers in a suit
against the owners of the streetcar. The defendant owners joined the driver of the automobile as an additional defendant. The court found that the conflict of interest between
the passengers and the driver of the automobile was sufficient to preclude the same attorney from representing both parties. 390 Pa. at 233-36, 135 A.2d at 253-55.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Bell argued that the defendant automobile driver
need not have separate counsel if the driver made "an informed choice." Id. at 237, 135
A.2d at 255 (Bell, J., dissenting).
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case to proceed against Attorney II and require that a new lawyer represent the client. If, however, the court found the complaint not valid, Attorney II could proceed with his representation of the client. Alternatively, courts could require claims for
contribution or indemnity to be brought in a subsequent proceeding of Attorney I against Attorney II. While this would prevent the issue from directly interfering with the proceeding, it
could continue to affect Attorney II's judgment because he may
have the subsequent litigation in mind during his representation
of the client. Moreover, the use of subsequent proceedings could
create res judicata and collateral estoppel problems as well.
A final consideration in analyzing the policy reasons for allowing claims for contribution or indemnity against a successor
attorney deals with the interests of the former attorney in asserting such claims. Normally, attorneys will be covered by malpractice insurance. Thus, in a typical case the interest in asserting these claims is the interest of the malpractice insurance
carrier in shifting at least part of the loss to the malpractice insurance carrier of the successor attorney. When considered in
light of the impact on the judicial system, the client's right to
choose counsel, and the impact on the successor attorney's independent judgment, this interest seems relatively unimportant.
Furthermore, malpractice carriers could adjust easily to the absence of such a right by increasing their premiums.
On balance, then, allowing claims for contribution or indemnity against successor attorneys in any situation, even those involving what the Parker court referred to as cases not involving
choices between alternative courses of action, does not seem
wise. Even in these situations, there could be an impact on the
successor attorney's independent judgment resulting in the disruption of the efficient functioning of the judicial system. Furthermore, the interest in pursuing these claims is essentially the
interest of the malpractice insurance carrier in shifting part of
the loss to another malpractice insurance carrier, an interest
which does not seem particularly strong in light of the counter
balance provided by the other policy considerations.
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LIABILITY OF CO-COUNSEL

Theories-Application of Agency Law

In cases involving successor attorneys, no contractual relationship exists between the successor and prior attorney. Hence,
liability is founded on the equitable principles of contribution or
indemnity. When lawyers are co-counsel, however, a different

basis of liability can be used in a claim by one co-counsel against
the other-agency or breach of fiduciary duty.
To determine how the principles of agency affect recovery,

it is important to distinguish between three types of relationships: agency, sub-agency, and co-agency. An agent is a person

appointed by another (the principal) to act on the behalf of the
principal, subject to his direction and control.7 1 A sub-agent is a
person appointed by an agent, pursuant to the authority of the
principal, to perform duties undertaken by the agent for the
principal and for whose actions the agent is responsible.7 2 A coagent is an agent appointed by the principal to handle one aspect of a matter on behalf of the principal while another co-

agent handles another aspect of the matter. Both co-agents operate under the direction and control of the principal.7 3 Generally, neither co-agent is responsible to the other.7 4
The co-agency situation poses little problem. Under agency
law, co-agents are not responsible to one another.7 Furthermore,
claims among co-agents are unlikely to arise because co-agents
normally have little contact with each other but instead operate

71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1), 1(3) (1957) [hereinafter cited as
AGENCY].
72. AGENCY, supra note 71, at § 5(1).

73. Id. Comment a. See also id. § 5(1) Comment c (distinguishing a sub-agent from
an agent for an agent and an agent for a principal).

74. See id. §§ 363-67, 373-74. In multiple attorney situations, both co-agency and
sub-agency relationships can exist. For example, suppose an insurance company is the
products liability carrier for an asbestos manufacturer who is a defendant in asbestosis
suits. The insurance company might coordinate its legal representation in one of two
ways. First, the company might hire a number of law firms to handle the cases in different parts of the country. Each of the law firms would be a co-agent of the insurance
company. Second, the company might hire one large law firm to have overall responsibility for coordinating the litigation. This law firm, in turn, might hire other law firms to
handle the matters for them in various parts of the country. The second law firms would
be sub-agents of the larger firm.
75. Id.
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under the direct control of the principal or the principal's agent.
A conflict between a sub-agent and agent is more likely to
arise. For example, suppose a New York law firm with an insurance carrier client hires a South Carolina law firm to handle local asbestos litigation. The South Carolina firm commits malpractice and the insurance carrier client brings suit against the
New York and South Carolina firms. Does the New York firm,
the agent, have a right of recovery against the South Carolina
firm, the sub-agent? On the other hand, suppose the New York
firm directs the South Carolina firm to go to trial in one of the
asbestos cases and the jury returns a large plaintiff's verdict.
The insurance carrier brings a suit against both the New York
and South Carolina firms claiming that they were negligent in
deciding to take the case to trial. May the South Carolina firm,
assuming the firm properly handled the litigation, recover from
the New York law firm?
Both general agency law and the one case which has considered the question 6 support the right of agents and sub-agents to
recover from one another. Under agency law a sub-agent is responsible to an agent for negligence in performance of his duties.77 Thus, in the first example, the New York firm should have
a right of recovery against the South Carolina firm. Similarly, a
sub-agent has a right of indemnification against the agent if the
sub-agent suffers a loss while acting under the direction of the
agent.7 8 Therefore, in the second example, the South Carolina
firm should have a right of indemnification against the New
York firm.
B.

Case Law

In Pollack v. Lytle, 9 a client retained an attorney to handle
the client's medical malpractice action against a doctor. Attorney I referred the case to Attorney II.80 Attorney II discovered
that the action required expert testimony by a neurosurgeon,

76. Pollack v. Lytle, 120 Cal. App. 3d 931, 175 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1981). See supra notes
79-91 and accompanying text.

77.

AGENCY,

supra note 71, § 459.

78. Id. §§ 438(1), 438(2)(b). See also id. § 439 (specific instances when an agent has

a duty to indemnify a sub-agent).
79. 120 Cal. App. 3d 931, 175 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1981).
80 Id. at 947, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 90 n.1 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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but that a neurosurgeon would be extremely reluctant to testify.
Before trial, a third attorney (Attorney III) contacted Attorney
II and falsely represented that he was associated with a firm
specializing in medical malpractice and was a personal friend of
a certified neurosurgeon. Attorney III offered to have the surgeon review the client's records and examine the client. Attorney
III later falsely stated that in the surgeon's expert opinion, the
client's doctor had violated standard medical practice. Attorney
III further offered to obtain the expert's testimony at trial in
exchange for being associated on the case. Attorney II agreed
and continued to advance funds for all expenses in return for a
fifty percent contingency fee.81 However, prior to the conclusion
of the case and the payment of the contingency fee, Attorney III
induced the client to discharge Attorney 11.82
Attorney III's continued misrepresentation and negligence
caused the client to lose any opportunity for pretrial settlement
or success at trial.8 3 Attorney III ultimately induced the client to
bring a malpractice action against Attorney II. Attorney II then
brought an action against Attorney III for fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, breach of contract, legal malpractice, and declaratory relief in the form of indemnity.8 4 Attorney II appealed the
lower court's order of dismissal. 5
The California Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the
case. The court found that Attorney II pled sufficient facts to
prove an agency relationship between Attorney II and Attorney
III. The court reasoned that the agency relationship was a
fiduciary relationship requiring "the fullest disclosure of all material facts which might affect his principal's decision-making. "86
The court stated that the breach of the fiduciary duty by Attor-

81. The fee agreement was that "[Attorney I] agreed to advance all necessary expenses in return for a 50% contingency fee and reimbursement for expense advances
made. Reimbursement was not contingent upon the recovery of damages." Id. at 936, 175
Cal. Rptr. at 83. Apparently, the attorney's fee was contingent upon recovery; he would
receive 50% of the damage award. But reimbursement for his expenses incurred in prosecuting the case was not contingent; he would receive all expenses regardless of the verdict. All three attorneys were to share the 50% contingency fee. Id. at 936-38, 175 Cal.
Rptr. at 83-84.
82. Id. at 938, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 939, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
85. Id. at 936, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
86. Id. at 940, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 85 (citations omitted).
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ney III was the proximate cause of Attorney II's injuries.8 7
The appellate court noted the line of California cases holding "as a matter of public policy, that a successor attorney owes
no duty to his predecessor," 8 but distinguished the roles of successor and associate attorneys. According to Pollack, a successor
attorney has a duty of undivided loyalty to review the client's
case without being threatened by liability to a prior attorney.
The Pollack court held that "in contrast, an associate attorney
acting as the agent of the principal replaces no one, but acts at
the behest of his principal."8 9
The Pollack court also found that an associate attorney's
primary duty to act in the best interests of the client created no
conflict of interest. If an associate attorney believes a course of
action is contrary to a client's best interests, she is obligated to
disclose that information to the client. If the principal attorney
chooses to ignore the disclosure, and the associate attorney remains convinced the conduct is wrong, she may withdraw as
counsel.90 Because an associate attorney owes the same duty of
care, skill, and diligence to the client as she does to her principal, the Pollack court concluded that to hold that an associate
owes a duty only to the client could create conflicts in defining
the client's best interest and would be against public policy. The
court also indicated that under agency principles, it would be
unfair to relieve an associate attorney from liability to the principal attorney. The court, therefore, determined that the principal attorney had stated a claim for declaratory relief in the form
of indemnity.9 '
V.

ABILITY OF AN ATTORNEY TO OBTAIN CONTRIBUTION OR

INDEMNITY FROM AN ATTORNEY TO WHOM A CASE IS REFERRED

With the move toward specialization, more attorneys will be
referring clients to other attorneys who practice in specialized
areas of the law. If the client is dissatisfied with the new attorney, he might bring an action against the first attorney for negli87. Id. at 941-42, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
88. Id. at 942, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 86-87.
89. Id. at 942, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 87.

90. Withdrawal, of course, poses ethical problems. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
91. Pollack, 120 Cal. App. 3d at 943, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
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gent referral. As a result, the first attorney may seek contribution or indemnity from the second attorney. For example, a
client comes to Attorney I with a complex tax matter. Attorney I
is not a tax attorney and, therefore, refers the client to Attorney
II, a tax specialist. Attorney II handles the matter improperly.
The client then brings a malpractice action against both Attorney I for negligent referral and Attorney II for malpractice. Does
Attorney I have a right to contribution or indemnity from Attorney II?
Although the courts have yet to answer this question, an action for contribution or indemnity should be allowed. The policy
arguments against allowing contribution or indemnity do not apply in this situation as they do against a successor attorney. A
third attorney would handle the malpractice and negligent referral action against Attorneys I and II; therefore, allowing an action for contribution or indemnity would not interfere with Attorney II's exercise of professional judgment. There would be no
need to disqualify the attorney handling the malpractice case
because he would have no malpractice exposure. Thus, the judicial system would not be inconvenienced and allowing these
claims would not greatly increase the complexity of the case.
The only issue to be resolved is whether Attorney II committed
malpractice, the same issue that must be resolved in the client's
case against Attorney II. Further, allowing the referring attorney
to obtain contribution or indemnity will encourage attorneys to
refer cases. Assuming that it is desirable to have general practitioners refer cases to specialists, allowing the referring attorney
to seek contribution or indemnity makes sense.
VI.

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

This paper has examined relationships in which an attorney
might seek contribution or indemnity from another attorney.
These relationships are (1) the successor attorney against a prior
attorney, (2) associate attorney against another associate attorney, and (3) a prior attorney against an attorney to whom a case
has been referred.
In a successor attorney relationship, the Parker approach
should be rejected and a rule adopted barring an action for contribution and indemnity against a successor attorney. This conclusion is justified for several reasons. First, once courts allow
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actions for contribution and indemnity in some situations, the
judgment of successor attorneys will be affected. Second, allowing claims for contribution or indemnity create problems of
conflict of interest, and although there may be procedural remedies for the problem, the remedies are complex. Third, crossclaims for contribution or indemnity increase the complexity of
malpractice litigation. The only real benefit of a rule allowing
claims for contribution or indemnity is the protection of former
attorneys. Since most of these cases will be covered by malpractice insurance, this protection seems too insignificant a benefit
to justify the rule. Therefore, in the successor attorney situation,
there should be no right to contribution or indemnity.
Under agency law and case law, a sub-agent is responsible
to an agent for harm caused by his neglect or malpractice. Similarly, case law supports the right of the sub-agent to recover
from the agent if the sub-agent suffers harm as a result of actions taken under the direction of the agent.
Contribution or indemnity should be allowed in the referral
situation. These claims will not undermine the independent
judgment of the attorney to whom the case was referred, will not
require disqualification of trial counsel, and will not substantially increase the complexity of malpractice claims. In fact, allowing actions for contribution or indemnity promotes the social
policy of encouraging general practitioners to refer cases to
specialists.
Cynthia M. Parsons
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